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Introduction
Historical figures are often caricatured into cartoon characters that, while
maybe representing a partial truth about them, are an oversimplification of one
characteristic of that person or that person’s thought. For instance, romantics have
often vilified Benjamin Franklin as the cutthroat, “time is money” businessmen who
drove American capitalism to the point of work being the only worthy pursuit in life.
However, Franklin also wrote poetry and satire in addition to his business, political,
and scientific ventures. These oversimplifications run rampant in the field of
philosophy. Søren Kierkegaard is a philosopher who has not escaped this
misrepresentation. The picture often painted of Kierkegaard is that he is an
irrationalist. Faith is not rational, and requires a “leap of faith,” otherwise known as
just willing yourself to believe something that is not rational. When one reads the
works of Kierkegaard, one finds that such an easy statement about Kierkegaard is
not so applicable. This paper is going to dive in to this question of rationality
through the perspective of Søren Kierkegaard: Is faith irrational?
The point I will be arguing is that Kierkegaard is not actually an irrationalist.
I see his arguments in support of Christianity to be beyond the realm of what he saw
as human reason, which has its limits, and so rationality and irrationality are more
of a distracting side show in his discussion of faith. I will be arguing that
Kierkegaard did not think that Christian faith was rational or irrational, but
happened independently of rationality. Reason had a place within a person’s
existence to work out the minutiae of spheres that could be asked about in an
objective way, but objective rationality was a non-existent specter that could not
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come to any subjective truths concerning Christianity. The truth of Christianity for
Kierkegaard was not about objectivity. Throughout this paper, I will have to cover
Kierkegaard’s basic theology, going over the paradox, passion, offense, the
Incarnation, the single individual, revelation, and Christendom. The final section will
contain the culmination of my argument, in examining faith and my idea that I have
called the “Root Paradigm.” Before we begin, we must make two important notes
and examine the argument I will be arguing against.

Preliminary Notes
The first of these is the use of pseudonyms in Kierkegaard’s work. This paper
will not enter into any discussion of the pseudonyms used by Kierkegaard. While
these are important to note, this author sees a congruent enough strand of theology
running through all the works here cited to create a reasonable outline of his
philosophy. If more time were allowed, this would certainly become a factor in the
following analysis.
The second thing to note is the distinction between rationalism and reason.
Rationalism, as embodied by the philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, is the philosophical
system used to attain truth through rational means. According to the Oxford
Dictionary of Philosophy, rationalism is, “Any philosophy magnifying the role played
by unaided reason, in the acquisition and justification of knowledge.”1 Reason is
more of the logical reasoning within different philosophical systems. Reason is using
logic to come to different conclusions within the philosophical school you work
within, whether it be empiricism, rationalism, etc. Rationalism is a school of
1

Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 318.
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philosophy by itself. Reason is the use of logic to deduce truths within those schools
of thought.

Chapter 1: The Counter-Argument
The counter argument is often placed into a false dichotomy. Faith has to be
either rational or irrational. Kierkegaard did not support the role rationality played
when devising religious truth, and so he is painted as the opposite; an irrationalist.
His critics do not see the fact that the choice between rationality and irrationality is
a simplification and a false-dichotomy. Some of these critics include Herbert
Garelick, Brand Blanshard, and Alastair Hannay.
Blanshard is a fierce critic. He states that, “…The Christian supposes that
Jesus as Christ existed…it is a rationally impossible position.”2 In Garlick’s
interpretation, when one comes to face the paradox, one does not set reason and the
understanding aside, they believe in spite of reason. “…Realizing the rational
impossibility of the Paradox one nevertheless believes against his reason.”3 For
Garlick, the Christian faith is antithetical to reason and rationality.
For Garelick, as well as other critics such as Blanshard and Hannay, the
irrationality of Kierkegaard comes down to their interpretation of the Paradox. The
Paradox is seen as a logical contradiction. “The leap of faith is a daring, passionate
non-rational commitment to the paradoxical and the unintelligible.”4 Blanshard sees
it as a purely passionate commitment to believing and living out something that one
2

Herbert M. Garelick, The Anti-Christianity of Kierkegaard: A Study of Concluding Unscientific
Postscript (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 29.
3 Ibid., 32.
4 Brand Blanshard, “Kierkegaard on Faith,” in Essays on Kierkgaard, ed. Jerry H. Gill (Minneapolis:
Burgess Publishing Company, 1969), 114.
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knows to not be rational. It doesn’t matter that the Paradox does not follow the laws
of logic; one must commit to it. Hannay makes the same observation. Hannay speaks
of Kierkegaard’s writing about the deity and its attributes of both having existed in
time, yet still being eternal. He continues to say, “Here the paradox presents itself as
a direct breach of the general logical principle that nothing can simultaneously have
and lack the same property.”5
These three critics all have the same critique of Kierkegaard: they see the
Paradox to be a logical contradiction. This sets the scene for us to start looking at
Kierkegaard’s theology.

Chapter 2: The Paradox & Passion
The first thing we have to cover is the basic Christology of Kierkegaard. This
pertains to his ideas of the paradox and offense. We have to keep in mind that we
only have the space to scratch the surface, but Kierkegaard’s theological writing was
so self-involved, winding in and out of itself that we will find all of his ideas are
interconnected and essential to his overall philosophy.
The idea of the paradox is one of the central points through which the rest of
Kierkegaard’s theology is diffused. We must first look at the general idea of the
paradox, after which we will work through the ideas, and move on to thinking about
Jesus Christ as a paradox:
But one must not think ill of the paradox, for the paradox is the
passion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the
lover without passion: a mediocre fellow. But the ultimate
5
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potentiation of every passion is always to will its own downfall, and so
it is also the ultimate passion of the understanding [Forstand] to will
the collision, although in one way or another the collision must
become its downfall. This, then, is the ultimate paradox of thought: to
want to discover something that thought itself cannot think; 6
Kierkegaard assumes a person must be passionate about something. If a
person is not passionate about something, then they barely live their life. Everyone
is passionate about something because everybody is an existing human being
(provided they live with passion, which is not something everyone does). “Existing,
if this is not to be understood as just any sort of existing, cannot be done without
passion.”7 Passion aims to destroy itself. It wants itself to fall. For the understanding
then, for thought, the ultimate culmination of this is to think something that cannot
be thought. This is how it brings itself down. Kierkegaard frequently refers to Jesus
Christ as the paradox of the God-man. The underlying idea here is that God entered
into time to become a single individual. The eternal became temporal. This flies in
the face of human reason. The paradox is the ultimate passion of thought; a thought
that cannot be thought. The relationship between the paradox, the understanding
and faith is described below:
How, then, does the learner come to an understanding with this
paradox, for we do not say that he is supposed to understand the
paradox but is only to understand that this is the paradox. We have
already shown how this occurs. It occurs when the understanding and
the paradox happily encounter each other in the moment, when the
understanding steps aside and the paradox gives itself, and the third
something, the something in which this occurs (for it does not occur
through the understanding, which is discharged, or through the
paradox, which gives itself-consequently in something), is that happy
6

Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. & ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 37.
7 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. & ed.
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 311.
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passion to which we shall now give a name, although for us it is not a
matter of the name. We shall call it faith. This passion, then, must be
that above-mentioned condition that the paradox provides; 8
This quotation gives us quite a lot to examine. According to Kierkegaard,
Jesus is the God-man. He is a paradox. He does not seem to make sense. How could
Jesus have been both man and God? It is a seeming mystery. A human being
encounters Jesus in what Kierkegaard calls the moment, which is the moment that
the eternal intersects the temporal. In this moment, a human being tries to
understand Jesus, the paradox, the God-man. However, when a person realizes that
they are not able to understand the paradox but only that it is a paradox, it is the
understanding that steps aside, and the person accepts the paradox as it is. This is
done in faith, which is given as a gift.
“…the paradox specifically unites the contradictories, is the eternalizing of
the historical and the historicizing of the eternal.”9 The paradox unites the
contradictories. The paradox is a union of things that do not seem to belong to each
other; no one would ever think that they would belong with each other. It may not
be natural for them to be together; this is the paradox. But the question we have to
ask ourselves is how we should envision these contradictories in the paradox. The
natural assumption is to picture these as formal, logical contradictions. This is the
way most of Kierkegaard’s critics claim they are meant to be. An example of this
would be a square circle. Purely by the ideas represented by these words, they are at
odds. It is impossible for a square to be in the shape of a circle according to the
definitions we give these words. According to the Kierkegaard scholar Stephen
8
9

Kierkegaard, Fragments, 59.
Kierkegaard, Fragments, 61.
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Evans, “On this reading, Kierkegaardian faith requires the sacrifice of the intellect,
the suicide of reason.”10 It is clear that Kierkegaard never wanted the suicide of
reason or the sacrifice of the intellect, for the understanding steps aside as we have
seen in quotations above. The understanding survives, yet it takes a break from the
play of the game to allow faith to receive the paradox; it yields its playing time to
faith and sits out on the bench for a rest.
Evans does not believe that Kierkegaard is talking about a formal, logical
contradiction, and presents a solid case supporting it. “…we must recognize that the
term ‘contradiction’ is not used solely or even mainly in this period to refer to a
logical contradiction.”11 Evans goes on to write about the way that Hegel and his
followers used the term during the time period. Today we often think of a
“contradiction” in the way that I wrote of above; a logical contradiction such as a
square circle. This is the way that Kierkegaard’s critics have portrayed him, as we
saw earlier. Hegel used the term “…’contradiction’ to refer to any relation of
opposition.”12 Nature contained complexities that might have seemed to be logical
contradictions, but both in fact were involved in nature, such as irregularity and
regularity.13 This is the way in which Kierkegaard uses the term, “…to refer to some
relation of incongruity or experienced opposition.”14 In the words of Kierkegaard

10

C. Stephen Evans, Faith Beyond Reason: A Kierkegaardian Account (Grand Rapids & Cambridge:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998), 81.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 82.
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himself, “The God-man is an individual human being-not a fantastic unity that has
never existed except sub specie aeterni [under the aspect of eternity]…”15
Another piece of evidence Evans presents is that for the absolute paradox to
be such as it claims to be, “…it must be unique; the incarnation must somehow
qualify as the absurd.”16 A formal, logical contradiction is not unique. We could think
of several examples of formal contradictions that, by definition, cannot exist. The
Incarnation is one-of-a-kind. There is nothing like this in history. We saw in a
previous quotation that faith happens when the understanding steps aside of its
own will, and, in faith, one believes the Incarnation. But what happens when a
person does not believe the Incarnation? This is where Kierkegaard speaks of the
idea of Offense.

Chapter 3: Offense
What is offense for Kierkegaard? “The relation, the relation of personality to
Christianity, is not to doubt or to believe, but to be offended or to believe.”17 We can
see from this quotation that offense is, essentially, the opposite of faith. It is a refusal
of faith; it is a reaction against faith. It is also more than just doubt. Offense, in
today’s usage, rings of a visceral reaction against a statement, or a person, or an
ideology, etc. It is not just doubting and not believing the Christian message, but it is
a strong reaction against the message of Christianity.

15

Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans. & ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 126.
16 Evans, Faith Beyond Reason, 83.
17 Kierkegaard, Practice, 81n.
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If the understanding does not step aside to believe the paradox in faith, then
the person’s reason is offended:
There is so much talk about being offended by Christianity because it
is so dark and gloomy, offended because it is so rigorous etc., but it
would be best of all to explain for once that the real reason that men
are offended by Christianity is that it is too high, because its goal is not
man’s goal, because it wants to make man into something so
extraordinary that he cannot grasp the thought; 18
A person cannot even grasp the thought that Christianity wants the person to
think, and a common reaction to this is to have their reason offended. Who could
contemplate, reasonably, that God, the eternal, entered time and became an
individual human being? It’s too difficult to even think! God entered time to become
a lowly, rejected servant? Impossible!
The root of the paradox, however, is the idea that God came down and
became a human being. Jesus Christ was both man and God. “Essentially offense is
related to the composite of God and man, or to the God-man. Speculation has
naturally considered itself able to ‘comprehend’ the God-man-as one can very well
comprehend…”19 How is one supposed to understand this? It doesn’t seem as
though a person would be able to comprehend these two seemingly contradictory
things. However, the possibility of offense is essential to Christian faith. In fact,
Kierkegaard goes so far as to say that one can only come to faith by passing through
the possibility of offense. “The possibility of offense is the crossroad, or it is like
standing at the crossroad. From the possibility of offense, one turns either to offense

18

Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding
and Awakening, trans. & ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1980), 83.
19 Kierkegaard, Practice, 81.
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[in reason] or to faith [in Christ], but one never comes to faith except from the
possibility of offense.”20

Chapter 4: The Incarnation & Rationality
But what is the offense, that which offends? That which conflicts with
all (human) reason. And it is that which one wants to demonstrate!
But to ‘demonstrate’ is, after all, to make something into the rationalactual that it is. Can one, then, make that which conflicts with all
reason into the rational-actual? Certainly not, unless one wants to
contradict oneself. One can ‘demonstrate’ only that it conflicts with
reason;21
Kierkegaard did not posit that reason should never be used. He did not want
to completely destroy it. There was a place for it, but it was not the sole way of
thinking, especially when it came to the truth of Christianity. There will be much
more to speak about later as to a person being “solely rational,” yet we must begin
with Kierkegaard’s idea of the Incarnation.
The point of the incarnation, according to Kierkegaard, is that it is a
concept that reason cannot understand. This is so not because reason
has a perfectly clear grasp of what it means to be God and what it
means to be human and properly judges that the two concepts are
logically contradictory. In fact, just the reverse is the case. Human
reason is baffled both by human nature and by God. It is further
baffled by the conjunction of the two concepts, but not because reason
has a clear understanding of either what it means to be human or
what it means to be God. The incarnation may appear or seem to
human reason to be a logical contradiction, but it is not known to be
such, and the believer does not think that it is a formal
contradiction; 22

20

Ibid.
Ibid., 26.
22 Evans, Faith Beyond Reason, 83.
21
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Do human beings really know what makes a God? Do we really know what it
is to be a human being? Kierkegaard thought that human reason was not able to
know what it was to be a god or a human being. The paradox was not about logical
contradictions, the paradox “…is connected essentially with being a human being,
and qualitatively with each human being in particular, whether he has much or little
understanding.”23 The most intelligent and the least intelligent people have the
same ability to become a Christian. No matter a person’s intelligence they are still a
human being, and they still have the possibility of offense. They are still able to move
at the crossroads of offense to receive the paradox in faith.
The idea of the God-man strikes reason as ‘the strangest of all things’
because our universal experience is that the two are divergent. Our
own temporality is at best a partial, incomplete realization of the
eternal, and it generally includes an experience of failure. Hence we
find the idea that the eternal could be perfectly realized in a temporal
existence baffling; 24
This is what the paradox is; a baffling experience. It is not a logical
contradiction, although this is the typical way that many people interpret it today.
As we saw earlier, Kierkegaard does not mean it to be a logical contradiction. It is
meant to refer to any confusing or bewildering experience.
We have to now consider how Kierkegaard viewed reason. He saw human
reason as fundamentally flawed in a couple of ways. One important way was that
reason had its limits. It was not able to discover everything about our existence;
omniscience is not one of its attributes. One of the important boundaries for reason
was the Incarnation. When reason could recognize its own limit in the Incarnation,
23
24

Kierkegaard, Concluding, 566.
Evans, Faith Beyond Reason, 84-85.
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in the fact that the Incarnation unites the contradictories, it is humbled.25 Because of
this, reason is actually still necessary, for it is reason itself that realizes its own
limits. As Merigala Gabriel put it:
Although reason does not explain faith, it nevertheless performs the
valuable service of preparing and inviting man to accept it. Reason
performs the additional service of establishing the fact that the object
of faith transcends reason and cannot depend on it. Kierkegaard
points out that reason enables us to understand that it is impossible to
understand;26
It needs to be humbled, because Kierkegaard saw reason as a domineering
force. “Kierkegaard believes that reason has what we might term a restless,
domineering quality, in that it is always striving to master or appropriate whatever
it encounters.”27 Reason and rationality is the sociopath that works at a company,
employing sneaky, manipulative tactics to move up in the ranks. It seeks to
dominate what it investigates, embodying the will to power wherever it exists.
Reason is just like human beings: flawed and limited (which we know from
revelation, but more on that later). For this reason, to envision that becoming
absolutely rational and objective is the best way to move through life, Kierkegaard
thought, is wrong. We now move on to Kierkegaard’s problems with pure rationality
and objectivity.

Chapter 5: Objectivity & The Single Individual
To become completely objective is to lose your humanity. As Stephen Evans
puts it, “Human beings think as whole persons. It is human beings who reflect, not
25

Ibid., 80.
Merigala Gabriel, Subjectivity and Religious Truth in the Philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard (Macon:
Mercer University Press, 2010), 86.
27 Ibid., 96.
26
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brains or minds detached from concrete human persons. Their thinking therefore
necessarily reflects the shape of their human interests and habits.”28 To submit
yourself to fully rationalistic and objective arguments for the truth of Christianity is
to lose your identity. As Kierkegaard argues, Christianity is concerned with the
single individual. God came and existed as a single individual, not as an objective
system. “In order to shed light on logic, it might be desirable to become oriented
psychologically in the state of mind of someone who thinks the logical-what kind of
dying to oneself is required for that purpose, and to what extent the imagination
plays a part in it.”29 To think in completely logical terms is to die. One can become
objective when one no longer exists, because while living in this world we are
beings, living our lives through beliefs and systems that have an influence on the
way we argue about the world. Our past experience and assumptions play a part in
the way we think about the world, as well as the conclusions we come to about it. To
believe otherwise is sophistry. “If the person occupied with logical thought is also
human enough not to forget that he is an existing individual, even if he has finished
the system, the fantasticality and the charlatanry will gradually vanish.”30
For Kierkegaard, religious truths cannot be objectively verified. They must
instead by subjectively appropriated. Human beings are not objective, and because
of this, we cannot objectively and rationally discover if God does exist or not with
any type of absolute certainty. Annemarie van Stee writes a very interesting paper,
where she imagines Kierkegaard coming to give a talk at a University in our modern
28

Ibid., 98.
Kierkegaard, Concluding, 117.
30 Ibid.
29
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time. In the following quotation, Kierkegaard is speaking to the audience about the
objective uncertainty of God:
It is exactly because of the fundamental objective uncertainty
regarding God’s existence that I can and must have faith. It means I
have to actively hold fast to my faith in God. I need passion for that.
And by inwardly appropriating my faith in God in this manner, my
existence is transformed, which is what faith is all about;31
Kierkegaard has an acute sense of human nature, in realizing that nobody is
absolutely objective. Humans are not objective beings who can come to any
objectively certain proof of the existence of God because of the fact that we exist as
single individuals in this world. Because of this, faith is what takes the place of
objective certainty in the spheres that cannot contain objective certainty.
For Kierkegaard, “demonstrations” are always infused with assumptions and
premises. A person who makes a logical argument has already contained within the
premises of the argument the answer. In essence, perfect, rational objectivity is as
the self was for David Hume; water slipping through the fingers. A person who is
completely and absolutely objective has lost the very essence of themselves, their
humanity and their existence.32
In the third chapter of Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard lays out some
very interesting ideas that are necessary to our conversation here. He uses
Napoleon as an example of how many people’s reasoning often assumes the
conclusion within the premises from which they argue their point:

31

Annemarie van Stee, “Faith in a Rational Age: A Dialogue with Climacus,” in Kierkegaard Studies
Yearbook, ed. Heiko Schulz et al. (Berlin/Boston: CPI books GmbH, 2014), 160.
32 M. Jamie Ferreira, “Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair Hannay & Gordon D. Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 209-210.
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If one wanted to demonstrate Napoleon’s existence from Napoleon’s
works, would it not be most curious, since his existence certainly
explains the works but the works do not demonstrate his existence
unless I have already in advance interpreted the word ‘his’ in such a
way as to have assumed that he exists; 33
What Kierkegaard is saying with this example is that the conclusion is often
hidden within the premises of the argument. If you tried to argue that Napoleon
existed because of his performance at the battle of Waterloo, Napoleon’s existence is
already assumed when you bring up the battle of Waterloo. “Therefore, whether I
am moving in the world of sensate palpability or in the world of thought, I never
reason in conclusion to existence, but I reason in conclusion from existence.”34
Evans sees this as well. “…Climacus does not seem to object to an argument
that in some sense rests on faith rather than being a replacement for faith.”35 Evans
argues that on the surface, Climacus does reject apologetic arguments of one kind,
but he accepts another kind; that in which the premises are infused with the
conclusion. Climacus sees that human beings do not come to arguments, even
rational ones, as pre-suppositionless. Nobody argues from a vacuum. A person’s
experience and belief system will always play a part in how and what they argue for,
even in logical arguments. Evans documents how Climacus is perfectly comfortable
with Socrates arguing the teleological argument with the existence of God (which is
supposed to be the conclusion) infused into the reasoning that gets him to the
conclusion of God existing and giving nature a purpose.36 For Climacus, Socrates

33

Kierkegaard, Fragments, 40.
Ibid.
35 C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self: Collected Essays (Waco: Baylor University
Press, 2006), 144.
36 Ibid., 144-145.
34
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does not try to consciously come from an “objective” standpoint, but his experience
of the world allows him to see things in a certain way. This is not the logical fallacy
of begging the question, where one of the premises contains the conclusion within it.
God does not exist just because God exists. “Rather, the ‘subjectivity’ that Socrates
brings to his experience of the world might be an enabling factor, providing Socrates
with the skills and abilities needed to recognize features of the world that would
otherwise be unnoticed.”37 The subjective, breaking-in of truth is a lens that allows a
person to come to another truth of the world that would not be experienced through
an “objective” standpoint.
This is another way of saying that people already believe the things that they
argue for. Anyone who argues for something already believes in what they are
arguing for in some sense, otherwise they would not be mounting an argument for
it. Kierkegaard reacts strongly against the “objectivity” of rationalism, and shows
how a person’s belief system is inherent within the premises of their argument.
Kierkegaard did not think that human beings could actually become “objective.”
Even if they could, Christianity was not about being “objective.” He says it well in
this following paragraph:
Christianity, therefore, protests against all objectivity; it wants the
subject to be infinitely concerned about himself. What it asks about is
the subjectivity; the truth of Christianity, if it is at all, is only in this;
objectively, it is not at all. And even if it is only in one single subject,
then it is only in him, and there is greater Christian joy in heaven over
this one than over world history and the system, which as objective
powers are incommensurate with the essentially Christian; 38
The truth of Christianity is in subjectivity.
37
38
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The fact that Kierkegaard does not believe in absolute objectivity is related to
another emphasis of his; everybody exists as a single individual. Even God came
down to earth as an existing single individual. This means that, as people who live
our lives every day, the one thing we can’t do is not decide whether we have faith or
not. Even if we are undecided on the issue, our actions make statements about our
belief. Murray Rae puts it this way, “Agnosticism is not an option, for our actions are
themselves an expression of our personal beliefs and commitments.”39 This is what
is behind the leap of faith. “The ‘leap’ designates the fact that we are called upon to
act even though the life-view or principle by which we act has not been proven true
beyond all shadow of doubt.”40 The encounter with the paradox, the possibility of
offense, and the movement towards faith is all done by a single individual. It is all
about a single person and their humanity:
Thus offense is related to the single individual. And with this,
Christianity begins, that is, with making every man a single individual,
an individual sinner; and here everything that heaven and earth can
muster regarding the possibility of offense (God alone has control of
that) is concentrated-and this is Christianity. Then Christianity says to
each individual: You shall believe-that is, either you shall be offended
or you shall believe; 41

Chapter 6: Revelation & Sin
With all this emphasis on subjectivity, how is it that Christianity has a
common message? It would seem that, if religious truth is subjectively oriented then
religious truth would be victim to the whimsical notions of anybody. Christian

39
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doctrine could be as wide as the Grand Canyon, with people who all identify as
Christians giving very different teachings. What is the common identity with which
all Christians identify? It is the Bible, which contains the core teachings of
Christianity as revealed by God. One of these teachings is the doctrine of sin, which
Kierkegaard writes about most prominently in The Sickness Unto Death:
And no human being can come further than that; no man of himself
and by himself can declare what sin is, precisely because he is in sin;
all his talk about sin is basically a glossing over of sin, an excuse, a
sinful watering down. That is why Christianity begins in another way:
man has to learn what sin is by a revelation from God; sin is not a
matter of a person’s not having understood what is right but of his
being unwilling to understanding it, of his not willing what is right; 42
A fish has no concept of being fully submerged in water. It will glide right
through water, with no awareness of the surrounding chemical structure that keeps
it functioning. The same is to be said of human beings. It was not until late in our
development as a species when we discovered that the air around us consisted of
oxygen. We simply had no consciousness of the fact that the air around us contained
chemicals that were critical for our survival.
So it is with sin. We exist within sin, and therefore cannot on our own
become aware of the fact that we live within it. Unless an outer force breaks into our
awareness and alerts us to the fact that we live in a state called sin, it is not a force
we will recognize on our own. We have to learn from revelation. This is in part a
reaction to Kant. Human beings attain knowledge in certain ways, through certain
categories. We are not able to have experiences outside of time or space. Revelation
is the breaking in of God to catapult our consciousness onto another level of
42
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alertness; it is God refocusing our gaze in another direction, causing us to
understand truths that human beings could never come to realize on our own.
Because humans only take in part of reality, God shifts our paradigm to realize what
is really around us; the reality of sin.
This is also incorporated into Kierkegaard’s idea of offense. He does not write
about it formally along with the offensive nature of Christianity, but he offers us a
tempting, quick formulation of it in The Sickness Unto Death. “…in short, the
Christian teaching about sin is nothing but offensiveness toward man, charge upon
charge; it is the suit that the divine as the prosecutor ventures to bring against
man.”43 This teaching about sin is not something that is natural to human belief, yet
it is a teaching that must simply be believed on the authority of the revelation itself.
In a certain sense, Kierkegaard thinks that a human being has to purely believe in
the revelation. Evidence can do nothing to convince a person of the reality of the
revelation, nor should it:
It is not surprising, therefore, that for Kierkegaard religious truth lies
above the capacities of finite, temporal human beings. God as eternal
exceeds the power of human reason, and God as the eternal that has
become temporal is doubly baffling. For Kierkegaard, this revelation
on the part of God in human form should be believed because it has
been authoritatively revealed. Any attempt to justify its content on
philosophical grounds undermines the transcendent character of the
revelation; 44
Evans wrote about authority quite elegantly here. We also see it in
Kierkegaard:
But can any human being comprehend this Christian teaching? By no
means, for it is indeed Christianity and therefore involves offense. It
43
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must be believed. To comprehend is the range of man’s relation to the
human, but to believe is man’s relation to the divine. How then does
Christianity explain this incomprehensibility? Very consistently, in a
way just as incomprehensible: by revealing it; 45
This is Kierkegaard reaffirming that it is a truth that must be revealed,
because it is beyond human reason, and for this reason it must be purely believed on
its own authority.

Chapter 7: Christendom & The Understanding
The objective defense of Christianity was the root of Kierkegaard’s attacks on
Christendom. Christendom was an age and a culture where Christianity was a given.
Christianity was as common as eating. It is something that people just were. “Of
course I’m a Christian!” That’s all there was to it. There was no internal struggle or
reckoning with the eternal happiness that Christianity was trying to provide. It was
a cultural aptitude for the population, they were born Christian, and it was never
questioned or even thought about as an integral part of their identity. Kierkegaard’s
emphasis on the single individual, and the moment of decision with the paradox was
completely against this culture.
Imagine Christendom here in our current day, American culture (and to some
extent, it is quite clear this still exists in some places). A person is born to Christian
parents, baptized, and is raised in the church. That person lives their life in
American culture, just as all other secular and religious Americans do. Reading the
same books, watching the same movies, semi-involved in politics, but never making
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a large splash in the surrounding culture around them. They meet up with a nonbelieving friend in a coffee shop to catch up. They turn to religion, and start to
debate the existence of God and Jesus Christ, as well as the meaning of faith. The
Christian will give reasons and arguments in favor of God’s existence, which the
non-believing friend then argues back against. The Christian gives all the
philosophical arguments they can think of. Neither changes the others mind, but
they part amicably as always (they are friends, of course!), and go back to their lives.
They keep on living the same life in the culture surrounding them. Except for their
belief about God and the way they debate each other, one would never be able to tell
the difference between them.
This is the Christendom that Kierkegaard fights so strongly against.
Christianity has little effect on one’s life in the culture they live within, but one is a
fully believing Christian. It is a Christianity that is more interested in defending itself
in a rationalistic way against other religions than causing changes in the way a
person lives their life. Kierkegaard would often go on diatribes concerning
Christianity as a rationalistic, philosophical defense. The most passionate and
poignant is below:
What a priceless anticlimax-that something that passes all
understanding-is proved by three reasons, which, if they do anything
at all, presumably do not pass all understanding and, quite the
contrary, inevitably make it obvious to the understanding that this
bliss by no means passes all understanding, for ‘reasons,’ after all, lie
in the realm of the understanding. No, for that which passes all
understanding-and for him who believes in it-three reasons mean no
more than three bottles or three deer!-To go on, do you believe that a
lover would ever think of conducting a defense of his being in love,
that is, admit that to him it was not the absolute, unconditionally the
absolute, but that he thought of it as being in a class with arguments
against it and on that basis developed a defense; that is, do you believe
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that he could or would confess that he was not in love, inform against
himself that he was not in love?; 46
Kierkegaard, while having respect for the intellect, and in one sense putting
forward arguments in favor of Christianity, also did not believe that intellectuality
was the prime relationship a person had with Christianity. Christianity was more
about living than intellectually assenting to any set of doctrine. Stee puts it well, as if
Kierkegaard himself were saying it, “…busying myself with these arguments
distracts me from the task of existing in faith. It is much harder to live Christianly
than to abstractly and absentmindedly develop arguments about it.”47
The enlightenment, best personified by David Hume and Voltaire, had
championed reason and objectivity. In a reaction to this, defenders of Christianity
started to use rational arguments and objective evidence in order to “prove”
Christianity (although this actually didn’t start with the enlightenment, it intensified
with it). He makes the point that Christianity did not come into the world to be
explained. “…it seems strange that Christianity should have come into the world in
order to be explained, alas, as if it were itself puzzled about itself and therefore
came into the world to seek out the wise man, the speculative thinker, who can aid
with the explanation.”48
The culture had removed the possibility of offense in Christianity. A person
encounters Christ (or the paradox), and from here there are two possibilities, one
can be offended, or the intellect steps aside, and a happy encounter takes place with
the paradox within faith. Christendom had abolished this. One encounters Christ as
46
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one encounters a good friend at a coffee shop, without putting any work or struggle
into it, even enjoying it:
“In established Christendom, this and every other possibility of
offense is basically abolished-in established Christendom one
becomes a Christian in the most pleasant way of the world without
being aware of the slightest possibility of offense. In established
Christendom, the natural man has had it his own way. There is no
infinite contrast between what is Christian and what is secular. At
most, what is Christian is related to the secular as a potentiation, but
directly (particularly under the rubric of culture); it is an altogether
regular comparison, the positive form of which is: civic justice. Such
powerful measures to avoid offense as Christianity recommends are
not needed in established Christendom; 49

Chapter 8: Faith & The Root Paradigm
Here is the essence of everything I have argued and wish to argue: Faith is
neither rational nor irrational because it involves a belief system that is planted in
the root of a human being. It involves the entire essence of thinking, existing human
beings who have fears, hopes, desires and emotions of all kinds. It is almost a form
of intuitionism; a person interprets existence in such a way that the Christian
message does not have to be explained, it just is the way it is. The Christian faith is
the paradigm through which a person understands and, more importantly, acts in
the world, and it pervades and penetrates the person’s very being, influencing their
actions and how they interact with the world around them. When one becomes a
Christian, reason and rationality are set aside; Christian faith happens independently
of reason and rationality. As William Barrett wrote in his book, Irrational Man,
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“Strictly speaking, subjective truth is not a truth that I have, but a truth that I am.”50
A similar sounding statement to this interpretation is found in Kierkegaard’s writing
itself: “The how of the truth is precisely the truth.”51
Philosophical Fragments is the work that most systematically (if one can call
it that, Kierkegaard did not work in traditional “systems”) lays out the philosophical
categories of Christianity. He describes the moment, which is when a person comes
to experience a rebirth, which is essentially a complete and total reorientation of
one’s vision. The important aspect I want to note here is that this reorientation
involves much more than listening to arguments and evidence. For Kierkegaard, it is
not so much that one’s individual beliefs will change with new information, but the
entire paradigm, or structured framework of existence, through which a person
interprets reality, undergoes a major shift, to the extent that one “sees” things in a
completely new way. The method through which we interpret our existence, as well
as the actions that come about because of this re-envisioning, is radically changed.52
Evans, in his commentary on Philosophical Fragments, which is called Passionate
Reason, writes:
So Climacus’ argument cannot be seen as intended to convince the
non-Christian that Christianity is true, and insofar it does not
contradict the ‘Moral,’ which does not say that Christianity cannot be
known to be true, but rather that the question cannot be decided
without a ‘new organ,’ namely faith. Climacus’ remark is not an
‘objective argument,’ but one more reminder of how the person who
has the condition will see things; 53
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For someone to become a Christian, it is not about being convinced by
objective, rationalistic arguments. As we have seen above, Kierkegaard believes the
whole notion of “objectivity” to be a phantasm. Nobody is truly “objective,” because
we are individual, existing human beings. We do not come to beliefs in a vacuum.
Nobody becomes a Christian through abstract thinking and logical arguments:
What is abstract thinking? It is thinking where there is no thinker. It
ignores everything but thought, and in its own medium only thought
is. Existence is not thoughtless, but in existence thought is in an alien
medium. What does it mean, then, in the language of abstract thinking
to ask about actuality in the sense of existence when abstraction
expressly ignores it?; 54
It cannot be stated strongly enough, how Kierkegaard did not believe people
come to belief systems through a completely rationalistic way. People do not
examine the arguments, take their time, think through things a little bit, and then
decide that Christianity makes the most sense:
So, then, there is a man who wants to have faith; well, let the comedy
begin. He wants to have faith, but he wants to assure himself with the
aid of objective deliberation and approximation. What happens? With
the aid of approximation, the absurd becomes something else; it
becomes probable, it becomes more probable, it may become to a high
degree and exceedingly probable. Now he is all set to believe it, and he
dares to say of himself that he does not believe as shoemakers and
tailors and simple folk do, but only after long deliberation. Now he is
all set to believe it, but, lo and behold, now it has indeed become
impossible to believe it. The almost probable, the probable, the to-ahigh-degree and exceedingly probably-that he can almost know, or as
good as know, to a higher degree and exceedingly almost know-but
believe it, that cannot be done, for the absurd is precisely the object of
faith and only that can be believed; 55
Faith does not happen with certainty. It is a passion. A passion that involves a
person’s deepest desires, emotion, and essence of their humanity. This is what shifts
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when a person goes through a rebirth and becomes a Christian. “To make contact
with truth we need to be reshaped from the ground up, and for Kierkegaard that
requires a reorientation of our deepest desires.”56
Once one becomes a Christian, once a person interprets their existence
through the prism of Christianity, it is a truth that is lived, and not just understood.
“Religion is not a system of intellectual propositions to which the believer assents
because he knows it to be true, as a system of geometry is true; existentially, for the
individual himself, religion means in the end simply to be religious.”57 We are
existing, living human beings who live our lives. We are not thought. We are not
logic. We are not rationalistic beings. Kierkegaard recognizes this, and says that,
whether you are a Christian or not, the bottom line is that, as an individually existing
human being, the only thing that a person cannot do is not choose. One cannot opt
out of life; you have to live it! And that requires making decisions and living in a
certain way:
From his standpoint, to ask whether the goal of existence can be
achieved, or whether there is even a goal, is to opt out of life. It is not
that Climacus has up his sleeve some proof that life has a goal and that
it can be attained. Rather, he puts aside this option because
demanding such a proof would presuppose a detached perspective on
life which may be suitable for a being who is Pure Thought, but which
is inappropriate for an existing human being; 58
This “attached” perspective on life plays a role in our religious beliefs. Our
emotions and desires largely influence the belief systems that we find ourselves
becoming a part of. Human beings have presuppositions that allow ourselves to
56

Evans, Faith Beyond Reason, 112.
Barrett, Irrational Man, 170.
58 Evans, Passionate Reason, 32.
57

29
connect with one message rather than another, or even a certain interpretation of
existence over against another:
One way to think about Kierkegaard’s claims about subjectivity is to
see them as claims about the character of the ground of religious
beliefs. The specifically Christian beliefs he is discussing, for example,
can be understood as beliefs that require a particular set of emotions
(or ‘passions’ in Kierkegaard’s language). A person cannot come to
believe in Christ without a strong sense of sinfulness and a desperate
desire for God’s forgiveness. Those are the factors that produce the
beliefs. When they are present, the evidence is always sufficient; when
they are lacking, no amount of evidence is enough; 59
This quotation from Evans also shines a light on the fact that evidence is
usually assessed within the paradigm. For a non-Christian, no amount of evidence
may be enough to convince them of the objective truth of Christianity. However, for
somebody who is already within the paradigm, that evidence will become
convincing.

Conclusion
Kierkegaard did not envision faith to be an easy thing. He did not think it was
merely a belief to make us feel better and be more comfortable while patting
ourselves on the back. Faith requires a constant will to live religiously in the
terrifying wake of objective uncertainty. Throughout this paper, I have argued that
faith is not rational or irrational but happens independently. Human beings are not
objective thought structures, but exist as beings with emotions and desires. These
play a part in the formation of our belief structures and lead us to faith
independently of reason. Because of this, the fact that rationality and probability
59
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matter very little to Kierkegaard (when it comes to the formation of Christian faith),
it makes faith a terrifying, agonizing affair. While atheists in our day and age often
cite religious belief as a source of comfort, Kierkegaard would have thought of
reason and rationality as a source of comfort. The more and more faith in Christ was
probable, with good, logical reasons for support, the more one would feel comforted
by the increasing certainty. Gabriel puts it this way, “Kierkegaard disagreed with
traditional apologetic moves. He regarded them as objective props theologians used
in an effort to make belief easier.”60 The title of this paper comes from one of the
most poignant sections in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, where Kierkegaard
speaks of the terror of faith, because rationality has no part to play in one’s life of
faith. I will end with the quote from Kierkegaard on this sentiment:
I do not deny that it is comfortable to be a Christian and yet to be
exempted from the martyrdom that always remains even if no
external persecution is inflicted, and even if a Christian remains
unnoticed as if he had never lived at all-the martyrdom of believing
against the understanding, the mortal danger of lying out on 70,000
fathoms of water, and only there finding God. See, the wader feels his
way with his foot, lest he go out so far that he cannot touch bottom. In
the same way, with his understanding, the sensible person feels his
way in probability and finds God where probability suffices and
thanks him on the great festival days of probability when he has
obtained a really good job and there is the probability of quick
advancement to boot. And he thanks him when for a wife he finds a
girl both beautiful and congenial, and even Councilor of War
Marcussen says that it will be a happy marriage, that the girl has the
kind of beauty that in all probability will last a long time, and that she
is built in such a way that in all probability she will bear healthy and
strong children. To believe against the understanding is something
else, and to believe with the understanding cannot be done at all,
because the person who believes with the understanding talks only
about job and wife and fields and oxen and the like, which are in no
way the object of faith, since faith always thanks God, is always in
mortal danger in that collision of the infinite and the finite that is
60
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precisely a mortal danger for one who is composed of both. The
believer cares so little for probability that he fears it most of all, since
he knows very well that with it he is beginning to lose his faith; 61
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